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PROJECT #

"THE AAF IN THE INVASION OF  
SOUTHERN FRANCE"

P.R.C.

*Standardize*  
1. MAIN TITLE

(DO NOT USE STANDARD FMPU CARD)

HISTORY OF THE U. S.  
ARMY AIR FORCES

VOLUME

NO.

2. MAIN TITLE

THE AAF IN THE INVASION  
OF SOUTHERN FRANCE

00124450

3. SUB-TITLE

THE PRE-INVASION  
SITUATION

4. ANIMATION - SOUTHERN FRANCE AREA

When Allied airborne and amphibious troops invaded southern France in the early morning of 15 August 1944, they set in motion the fourth major attack against the occupied Continent in three months. . .

5. ANIMATION - SAME, WIDER ANGLE TO INCLUDE ALL OF EUROPE

First blow had been struck in Italy with the Allied offensive which began on the night of 11-12 May and carried forward some 200 miles to the Pisa-Rimini line, liberating Rome and liquidating at least a dozen German divisions. Second blow was the cross-channel invasion of Normandy which began on 6 June and had broken the German 7th Army, surrounded most of it, and was on the verge of capturing Paris. Third blow was the massive Soviet attack across the Pripet Marshes which began on 22 June and split the Baltic States at Riga, reach Warsaw in Poland, and was poised on the boundaries of East Prussia itself. . This was the picture on 15 August 1944, the date set for the in-

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vasion of southern France -- a date which found the Germans in a situation which was already desperate.

6. ANIMATION - SOUTHERN FRANCE, RIVIERA ? *chart?*

Though the Allied threat to the Riviera had been obvious for months, the hard-pressed Germans had been obliged to pull away a sizable proportion of the forces they had allocated to defend it. Only 10 Nazi divisions remained south of the River Loire, and only 7 were actually deployed along the Mediterranean Coast. Even more depleted was the German Air Force. After a year of strategic bombing by the Allies, there were estimated to be in southern France only 200 operational aircraft of which 130 were bombers designed for anti-shipping attacks.

7. ANIMATION - SAME - WIDER ANGLE *chart?*

It is believed that Germany might be able to scrape together from Italy and northern France another 50 bombers and 80 single-engine fighters. And as for German Naval defenses, these consisted of a handful of destroyers and torpedo boats and perhaps 5 U-boats.

8. RIVIERA COASTLINE

The coast they were guarding, however, was a rugged one, with rocky promontories overlooking small beaches -- and depleted and dispersed though the German defenses were, their capabilities were nevertheless considerable.

9. ANIMATION - SAME AS SCENE #6

The enemy increased the number of well-sited coastal batteries established long ago by the French at obvious points. And they also deployed some 450 heavy and light anti-aircraft guns on the area, largely along the shore. And finally, there seemed to be little chance of our effecting tactical surprise since...

10. CORSICA FROM THE AIR - SHOWING PREPARATIONS FOR INVASION

... the Allied build-up in Corsica was clearly visible to German reconnaissance aircraft.

11. MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR POWER READY FOR INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE

For the invasion, the Allies marshalled a force with clear-cut and overwhelming superiority in every respect. Five thousand aircraft could be available against the enemy's two hundred...

12. SEVENTH ARMY DIVISIONS READY FOR INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE

The U. S. Seventh Army could throw in against the 7 weak German divisions a stronger force of crack United States...

13. FRENCH DIVISIONS FOR INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE

... and French divisions, plus an assortment of...

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## 14. PARATROOPERS READY FOR INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE

... paratroop. . .

## 15. COMMANDOS READY FOR INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE

... Commando. . .

16. SPECIAL SERVICE TROOPS READY FOR INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE

... and Special Service forces.

## 17. NAVY SHOTS - U. S., BRITISH, FRENCH, ITALIAN WARSHIPS READY FOR INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE

And the inadequate German naval units would have to face, if they dared, 450 British, United States, French and Italian warships, including about 5 battleships and 10 aircraft carriers.

## 18. ANIMATION - SOUTHERN FRANCE, ITALY AND CORSICA

In collecting this array of power, the Allies faced two difficult problems: (1) the redeployment of available ground and air forces to enable a strike at Southern France without hindering the progress of the Fifth and Eighth Armies in Italy, and. . .

## 19. CORSICA - BEFORE THE ALLIES

... (2) the build-up of primitive, malarial Corsica into a satisfactory springboard. . .

## 20. CORSICA - CONTRAST, AFTER THE ALLIES

.. for the air participation in the landings. *out*

## 21. SAVILLE

Under Brig. Gen. Gordon P. Saville, the XII Tactical Air Command was charged with the responsibility of providing the air cooperation.

## 22. CORSICA SHOTS - OPERATIONAL AIRFIELDS READY FOR INVASION - SUPPLIES, AIRCRAFT, ETC.

By D-Day the Twelfth was effectively installed on 14 Corsican operational airfields, with all the supplies needed to maintain about 40 United States, British and French squadrons, plus some 6 squadrons on loan from the Strategic Air Force.

## 23. ANIMATION

Other elements of the Mediterranean Allied Air Force on call from the



from the Twelfth Tactical Air Command were based as follows: Provisional Troop Carrier Air Division -- west coast of Italy above Rome; Desert Air Force -- North Central Italy; Tactical Air Force's medium bombers -- Corsica and Sardinia; Strategic Air Force -- Foggia area; Coastal Air Force -- scattered throughout the area; and finally a Carrier Task Force, standing off-shore between Corsica and Toulon.

24. SUB-TITLE

PURPOSE OF THE INVASION

25. ANIMATION

The major purposes behind the operation were (1) to assist the Normandy attack by engaging German forces that might otherwise be used in northern France; (2) to capture a major port through which large-scale reinforcement could flow; (3) to liberate France; and (4) to join up with the cross-channel invasion for the decisive battle with the German armies of the west.

26. INSERT - SEVENTH ARMY'S FIELD ORDER NO. 1

The Seventh Army's Field Order No. 1 stated its assignment:

27. ANIMATION

to "assault the south coast of France, secure a beach-head east of Toulon and then assault and capture Toulon." Thereafter, its intention was to advance toward Lyon and Vichy or westward to the Atlantic as determined by developments, eventually joining up with the Allied armies in northern France.

28. INSERT - MAAF'S OUTLINE PLAN OF 12 JULY 1944

The task of the MAAF was stated in its Outline Plan of 12 July 1944:

29. AIR ACTION AGAINST ENEMY AIR FORCES - INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE CAMPAIGN

(a) to neutralize the enemy air forces;

30. AIR PROTECTION FOR ASSAULT CONVOYS - INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE

(b) to provide air protection for the assault convoys, for the assaults, and for subsequent operations;

31. AIR ASSAULT AGAINST ENEMY FORCES MOVING INTO ASSAULT AREA - SOUTHERN FRANCE

(c) to prevent or effectively retard movement of enemy forces into the assault area;

32. AIR SUPPORT OF GROUND ACTION - SOUTHERN FRANCE ASSAULT

(d) to assist the assault and subsequent operations of the ground forces



33. AIRBORNE TROOPS DROPPED DURING ASSAULT ON SOUTHERN FRANCE

(e) to transport and drop airborne troops engaged in the Operation;

## 34. DROPPING SUPPLIES TO MAQUIS - SOUTHERN FRANCE CAMPAIGN

(f) to cooperate with the Maquis by air action and air supply.

## 35. SUB-TITLE

## PLANNING THE OPERATION

## 36. ANIMATION - SOUTHERN FRANCE

As far back as 1 April 1943 the Allied forces were considering a possible landing in southern France; and, after intensive planning which was begun around the first of the following year, May 1944 was set as the time for the invasion.

## 37. ANIMATION - SOUTHERN FRANCE AND ITALY

However, the stalemate in Italy forced the Allies to discard this plan and concentrate on a decision at Rome.

## 38. TROOPS IN SUCCESSFUL ASSAULT ON ROME

In a battle that began on 11 May 1944, Rome was taken and a shattering defeat was inflicted on the German armies in that area. But the time was still not ripe:

## 39. TROOPS IN PURSUIT OF GERMANS AFTER ROME

we were in all-out pursuit of the disorganized enemy during early June when the Normandy assault began... and it was clearly inadvisable to halt in the middle of success in Italy to invade southern France.

## 40. ANIMATION - FRANCE AND ITALY AREA

By the end of June, however, the Allied armies had largely exploited their success and were slowing down in front of the strong Pisa-Rimini defense line... and in Normandy, though Cherbourg had been taken and the beach-head secured, our forces were temporarily stopped and had fallen definitely behind schedule. This was the time to strike.

## 41. WILSON

After approval by General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson of the Outline Plans, AFHQ directed that the invasion be launched on 15 August.

## 42. SUB-TITLE



THE MAAF'S OUTLINE  
AIR PLAN

43. ANIMATION ?

In addition to present responsibilities, the Tactical Air Force was to be responsible for detailed planning, for conduct of intruder missions; for protection of all convoys within 40 miles of the beaches until assumption by the Coastal Air Force of responsibility for the defense of southern France; for Air Sea Rescue in the assault area; and for organizing and directing Troop Carrier operations. . . The Coastal Air Force was to be responsible for defense of all convoys to within 40 miles of the beaches, for special overseas reconnaissance, anti-submarine work, etc., and for Air Sea Rescue outside the assault area... The Strategic Air Force would be charged with supplying help required by the Tactical Air Force which have been passed on by Headquarters of the MAAF...The XII Tactical Air Command would be in control, under the Tactical Air Force, of all tactical units operating in the assault area, including carrier-borne aircraft. The AAF Service Command would be responsible for supplying all units in Corsica...And the AAF Engineer Command was to develop airfields in Corsica and later in southern France.

44. ANIMATION

Each of the three Major units involved -- the Strategic Coastal and Tactical Air Forces -- produced its own plan of operation for its work in the invasion. In the case of Strategic and Tactical, these plans called for little more than normal performance of routine tasks...However, upon Tactical fell the major burden of the job.

45. CANNON

- Maj. Gen. John K. Cannon, commander of Tactical, in addition to planning the actual assault operations, had to reorganize his entire air force and occupy the new bases in Corsica.

46. ANIMATION - ITALY, SOUTHERN FRANCE, NORTHERN AFRICA

His problem was to muster adequate striking force for the assault on France without depleting the air power behind General Alexander in Italy. He solved it by leaving to Desert Air Force the cooperation with the armies in Italy and moving the XII Tactical Air Command to Corsica. The Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force's two medium bomber wings were kept separate, available to help either Desert Air Force or XII Tactical Air Command.

47. ANIMATION - SAME, INCLUDING ENGLAND

Since the Mediterranean theatre had been largely stripped of troop carrier units for Normandy, it was necessary to borrow these airborne troops back again from England

48. SUB-TITLE



THE BUILD-UP  
IN  
CORSICA

49. AJACCIO - BEFORE BUILD-UP

There were only two ports on the island of Corsica. Ajaccio, with a capacity of 3,000 tons a day..

50. BASTIA

.. and Bastia, capacity 2000 tons. This port, however, could not be used because the Germans were mining the channel nightly.

51. CORSICA - FROM THE AIR

The Terrain in Corsica made it imperative to build practically all operational airfields on the east coast.

52. DEMOLISHED BRIDGES - CORSICA EAST COAST

No internal transportation existed. Every railroad bridge on the east coast had been demolished.

53. DEMOLISHED BRIDGES AND TUNNELS - CORSICA - ROUTE FROM BASTIA TO AJACCIO

Bridges and tunnels on the cross-island route from Ajaccio to Bastia had been destroyed.

54. PORTOVECCHIO

To begin preparations a small artificial port was constructed at Portovecchio, capable of receiving 200 tons a day in very small vessels.

55. AJACCIO BUILD-UP

A build-up was immediately begun at Ajaccio on the east coast, and shipments were made to east coast airfields. . .

56. LCT'S at AJACCIO

... by Navy LCT's

57. LCT's AT BASTIA

Later, Bastia also accommodated LCT's.

58. PORTOVECCHIO-BASTIA PIPELINE

A gasoline pipeline with reversible pumping system was constructed from Portovecchio to Bastia.



## 59. BULK STORAGE, GASOLINE - CORSICA

One hundred eleven thousand barrels were erected for bulk storage on the island. . .

## 60. BULK STORAGE, GASOLINE - MADDALENA

... fifty-nine thousand barrels for bulk storage already existed on the island of Maddalena. This storage was kept full as a readily available reserve...

## 61. TANKERS AT MADDALENA

...and in addition, 100,000 barrels in tankers were kept at Maddalena as floating storage for immediate use.

## 62. ELEMENTS OF COASTAL AIR FORCE - CORSICA

By 15 May, all elements of Coastal Air Force scheduled for Corsica were on the island...

## 63. BOMBARDMENT WING - 12TH AIR FORCE

...as well as a bombardment wing of the Twelfth Air Force. . .

## 64. ELEMENT OF AN RAF WING - CORSICA

...together with certain elements of an RAF wing, constituting a coastal air force of offensive striking power.

## 65. PLANES OF XII TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

In addition to these forces, the Operation called for the Twelfth Tactical Air Command, reinforced by some French squadrons and some RAF Squadrons, as the main assault force.

## 66. AIR ECHELONS MOVING OUT OF ITALY

This entire assault force was moved into Corsica in an eight-day period, without any cessation in operations...

## 67. AIR ECHELONS ARRIVING IN CORSICA

...by dividing each squadron into advance and rear echelons...

## 68. LST FERRY LIFT - CORSICA

..and by LST ferry lift.

## 69. BOMBS

The estimated requirement in bombs was 52,000 tons. The requirement was met by bringing...



70. LIBERTY SHIPS - CAGLIARI

...Liberty ships into Cagliari and trans-shipping via coasters discharging along the east coast of Corsica.

71. ANIMATION

There were two small airfields which could be considered operational: Ajaccio and Calvi, on the west side of the island. They were improved and enlarged. In addition, Ghisonaccia and Borgo on the east side were repaired, improved and enlarged. On 10 August there were 14 operational air fields, all-weather and semi-all weather, available for use by fighters, fighter-bombers and medium bombers. Eighteen groups of tactical aircraft could readily be accommodated.

72. AVIATION ENGINEERS - CORSICA

During early construction operations, employable aviation engineer units varied from half a battalion to two and one-half battalions. Supplemental by other labor, these troops expedited early completion of new airfields...

73. SOLENZARA OR ALESAN

...such as Solenzara and Alesan. With these few units all work was done, including the numerous related airfield installations and projects such as...

74. AVIATION ENGINEERS REMOVING MINES - CORSICA

...removing mines...

75. RADAR STATION - CORSICA

...building radar stations...

76. ACCESS ROAD - CORSICA

...and access roads to gasoline and bomb dumps and water points...

77. AVIATION ENGINEERS CLEARING BRUSH-CORSICA

..the elimination of brush and dry vegetation fire hazards...

78. AVIATION ENGINEERS ERECTING AIRFIELD BUILDING - CORSICA

...and erection of airfield buildings.

79. SUB-TITLE

OPERATIONS  
PHASE I  
(To D-Day Minus 5)



## 80. BOMBS ON TOULON - 28 APRIL 1944

Air Operations in the campaign against southern France began as early as 28 April 1944 when heavy bombers attacked Toulon.

## 81. BOMBS ON SOUTHERN FRANCE - BETWEEN 28 APRIL and 10 AUGUST 1944

Between that time and 10 August, when the preliminary air phase started, MAAF flew more than 6,000 sorties and dropped 12,500 tons of bombs on southern France. There was a variety of reasons for these attacks: normal anti-U-boat and anti-Luftwaffe, interdiction of supply lines into Italy and smashing French marshaling yards. More than 25% of the sorties were specifically designed to aid the coming assault on southern France; the remainder rendered indirect cooperation for that assault and direct cooperation with the Normandy attack... Heaviest tonnage was dropped on lines of communication; next heaviest on ports, industry and air-fields in that order... In addition to the extensive military damage, the long series of sporadic attacks helped to cloak the Allied assault plan by preventing the planned preliminary air phase from being immediately evident as such when it began on 10 August.

## 82. COUNTER AIR OPERATIONS - MARSEILLE AREA

During the last five days of Phase I three tasks were assigned to the air forces: (1) counter air operations by Strategic in the Marseille area...

## 83. SAME - TOULOUSE AREA

. . . the Toulouse area . . .

## 84. SAME - UDINE AREA

...and the Udine area...

## 85. SAME - PO VALLEY

. . .and by Tactical in the Po Valley.

## 86. BOMBS OVER RAIL LINE

(2) Interdiction of communications, with Strategic taking the rail line Valence-Grenoble-Montmelian-Modane and...

## 87. BOMBS OVER RAIL BRIDGES

. . . Tactical the rail bridges across the Rhone south of Valence as well as its regular operational areas in northern Italy.

## 88. BOMBS OVER TOULON WATERS

And third, anti-U-boat operations, chiefly in Toulon waters, by Strategic.

## 89. SUB-TITLE



## PHASE II

(D MINUS 5 TO 0350 (H) HOURS D-DAY)

## 90. BOMBERS

Beginning 10 August a new set of assignments took priority over the three tasks of Phase I which, however, continued to be Air Force responsibilities.

## 91. STRIKES

Phase II called for the neutralization of the main coastal batteries and radar stations on the assault area and the harrassing of coastal defense troops by heavy bombing without jeopardizing tactical surprise.

## 92. ANIMATION

In connection with the deception plan, attacks on the invasion area were to be screened by similar offensive action against identical targets in four coastal localities between Via Reggio and Beziers. By alternating and scattering the intense bombing effort among these four areas it was hoped to maintain the fiction of a false attack and conceal the true Allied intent until about H minus 16 hours.

## 93. ANIMATION

Effective sorties total 5,408. 6,740 tons of bombs were dropped -- 4,451 by Strategic, the remainder by Tactical. We lost 50 aircraft -- 15 heavies, 4 mediums, 2 patrol bombers and 29 fighters or fighter-bombers.

## 94. SUB-TITLE

## PHASE III

(B-HOUR D-DAY TO H-HOUR D-DAY)

## 95. ANIMATION

The purpose of Phase III: "To cause the maximum destruction to enemy coastal and beach defenses utilizing all available forces"...The planned schedule of attack: from 0550 to 0610 --small formations, each of 4 fighter-bombers, would patrol the assault area and silence any guns seen firing...from 0610 to 0730--small formations of heavy medium and fighter-bombers would repeatedly attack and destroy selected gun positions...from 0635 to 0730--small formations of fighter-bombers would attack selected gun positions...from 0700 to 0730--formations of medium and heavy bombers would carry out heavy attacks on the assault beaches to destroy beach defenses and underwater obstacles . . . Beaches were to be bombed over their whole length and to a depth of 400 yards, the pattern commencing 75 yards to seaward. All aircraft were assigned rigid lanes of approach to the assault area. To avoid damage to friendly naval craft, no beach bombing runs were allowed at an angle greater than 45 ° to the beach-line.

## 96. BOMBS

Bomb loadings for beach attacks were fragmentation. . .



97. BOMBS

...and demolition, instantaneously fused; and

98. BOMBS

for gun positions, large demolition bombs with short delay fuzing were used.

99. DAWN, D-DAY

Dawn of D-Day found the beach area overcast. Because of the limitation of PFF attack in the interest of safety for our surface forces, some of the heavy sorties were noneffective.

100. BOMBS THROUGH BREAK IN CLOUDS - D-Day

The remainder used PFF technique or found an occasional hole in the overcast which permitted visual attack.

101. MEDIUMS FLYING THROUGH OVERCAST, D-DAY

A large percentage of the medium effort was likewise frustrated.

102. ANIMATION

All told, in Phase III, MAAF dispatched 959 sorties of which 610 were effective, dropped 774 tons of bombs, lost 2 heavies, 3 mediums and 1 fighter-bomber.

103. EIGHTH AIR FORCE BOMBERS ON WAY TO DIJON - 14 AUGUST 1944

The Eighth Air Force was placed on call to aid the MAAF, but actually its help was not needed, and attacks were made by it...

104. EIGHTH AIR FORCE BOMBS ON GERMAN AIRFIELD, DIJON AREA - 14 AUGUST 1944

...only on 14 August against German airfields in the Dijon area.

105. ANIMATION

Following this heavy aerial preparation, commandos and paratroopers landed on D minus 1 to silence batteries on the Hyeres Isles which dominated the St. Tropez beaches, and to cut the one coastal highway at each end of the projected beach-head area...Then came the main assault at H-Hour by 3 U. S. divisions and a glider-borne task force.

106. TROOPS ASSAULTING BEACH - D-DAY, H\*HOUR.

So highly satisfactory were the results of the preparatory air operations despite the weather, that the assault divisions...

107. GLIDERS LANDING - D-DAY, H-HOUR

...and the glider-borne task force met virtually no opposition.



## 108. TROOPS MOVING UP BEACH

## 109. MORE TROOPS LEAVING LANDING BARGES

Naval and Army Commanders attributed their successes and small losses largely to the effect produced by Air Force operations during the periods prior to D-Day and on D-Day itself.

## 110. TROOPS MOVING UP BEACHES

## 111. SUB-TITLE

PHASE IV  
(FOLLOWING H-HOUR)

## 112. BOMBS ON ENEMY GROUND DEFENSE

The air plan which went into effect immediately following H-Hour followed the normal procedure of air cooperation with ground advance: first, to cause maximum destruction of defenses in the assault area...

## 113. BOMBS ON BRIDGE

Second, to isolate the battlefield by destroying the remaining rail and road bridges across the Rhone and other rivers...

## 114. AIR ATTACK ON ENEMY TROOP MOVEMENT

And third, to attack enemy troop movements.

## 115. D-DAY - HEAVY AIR ACTIVITY

D-Day witnessed the mightiest air effort ever put out in a single day in the Mediterranean: 4,249 effective sorties, of which 3,936 participated in the ground attack. Allied air supremacy was so complete that the German Air Force could be virtually forgotten...

## 116. GERMAN PLANES IN AIR - D-DAY

The Luftwaffe flew but 60 sorties on D-Day and 70 in D plus 1.

## 117. ME 109's IN FLIGHT

The only German reinforcements brought up were 30 ME 109's from Italy, and the enemy's fighter force still was...

118. ME 109 SHOT DOWN (GSAP) *check?*

...utterly incapable of interfering with the Allies or protecting its own troops or bases.



## 119. INVASION CONVOYS IN AJACCIO HARBOR - FROM AIR - 12 AUGUST 1944

Although German reconnaissance undoubtedly had spotted the invasion convoys in Ajaccio harbor on the morning of the 12th, its other successes were inconspicuous:

## 120. GERMAN BOMBING OPERATIONS - 15-19 AUGUST

Small forces of JU-88's hit shipping and ground targets with poor results on the 15th through the 19th --and by the end of the week the German bomber force had to be moved back to the Lyon area.

## 121. BOMBS FALLING FROM U.S. BOMBER

German communications were badly broken: at the end of the first week of the invasion...

## 122. BOMBS ON RAIL BRIDGE OVER RHONE

*all but*  
...~~only~~ one of the 6 railway bridges across the Rhone were down.

## 123. SEVENTH ARMY

Best indication of the success of the many air operations was the swift advance of the Seventh Army. By D plus 7 there was no question of the success of the invasion.

## 124. ANIMATION

Not only had the beach-head been secured, but Toulon was surrounded, Marseille almost surrounded, and armored forces were heading rapidly for Lyon from the Rhone below Valence. Complete conquest of southern France was only a matter of time.

## 125. DEVERS

And on 21 August, Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, Deputy Commander of AFHQ, wrote to:

## 126. EAKER

Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, Air Commander-in-Chief...

## 127. CANNON

Maj. Gen. John K. Cannon, Commander of the Tactical Air Force,

## 128. TWINING

Gen. Nathan F. Twining,

## 129. SAVILLE

and Brig. Gen. Gordon P. Saville, commander of the XII Tactical Air Command,

*telling them "your aerial preparation + later support made possible our great gains."*

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## 130. SUB-TITLE

OPERATIONS  
DURING THE  
SECOND WEEK

## 131. ANIMATION

Fanning out westward and northward, the Seventh Army captured Toulon and Marseille in the westward drive and simultaneously pushed two separate forces northward almost as far as Lyon. One of these spearheads advanced directly north to Lake Grenoble; the other cut across the Rhone below Valence, then turned down the river to Montelimar and up toward Lyon. Forward elements of American troops were reported on the Swiss border and others probing eastward had come up against German defenses of the approaches to Italy through the Alpine passes. Meanwhile French Forces of the Interior had seized Toulouse, cleared Haute Savoie and mopped up German remnants in dozens of isolated localities.

## 132. ANIMATION

MAAF continued to operate in accordance with the Phase IV plan. Weak opposition allowed complete withdrawal of Strategic Air Force...and since the Mediterranean coast was virtually cleared of the enemy, Coastal's participation was only slight -- 614 sorties during the week.

## 133. TACTICAL AIR FORCE ACTION - SECOND WEEK

Almost the entire burden of the air operation rested with Tactical Air Force which flew 3,299 effective sorties and dropped 1,907 tons of bombs, approximately evenly divided between enemy concentrations and lines of communication.

## 134. TAF FIGHTER-BOMBER ACTION - SECOND WEEK.

At this point it became apparent that further widespread destruction of rail and road communications might well be a greater disadvantage to our own swiftly advancing forces than to the retreating and partly disorganized enemy. The aim of our attack was changed to the blocking of enemy escape routes rather than the cutting of lines of supply. This meant that our pattern of attack changed from medium bombers hitting major bridges to fighter-bombers attacking minor road and rail bridges immediately ahead of the retreating German forces.

## 135. ANIMATION

As the front rapidly moved away from the beach-head area it became increasingly difficult to keep pace with the advance from bases in Corsica. Plans for the development of operational fields in France were expedited.

## 136. NEW FIELDS IN FRANCE

By the end of the week six fields, some of them nothing more than landing



strips cut through vineyards, were operational and substantial elements had made the shift from Corsica to the mainland. These included 3 U. S. P-47 groups, 1 RAF Spitfire TR squadron, and 1 U. S. P-51 observation squadron.

137. GERMANS

Though still far from beaten, the enemy was disorganized, desperate, confusedly retreating.

138. ARNOLD

From the Commanding General came a message of warm commendation to all AAF units participating in the campaign for their contribution to the over-all success against the enemy in southern France.